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Summary 
To date England has decided not to opt into the proposed EU Regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 
authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a 
European Certificate. However, with an eventual opt in England fully 
engages with the ongoing negotiations on the proposed Regulation between 
the Member States. From the English viewpoint, the core issues of the 
Regulation comprise the connecting factor of habitual residence and the 
impact of foreign clawback regimes. The English conflict of law rules differ 
considerably from the Regulation and if England does not adopt the 
Regulation, these rules will coexist. 
 
The English conflict of law rules are based on a scission system where 
movable property is governed by the law of domicile and the immovable 
property by the State where it is located. This can be compared to the 
Regulation which is based on a unitary system where a single law is 
applicable to the succession as a whole. The scission approach has been 
under a great deal of criticism for causing distribution of property that is 
unfair and unreasonable as different laws will be applied to property located 
in different States, but belonging to the same person. A unitary system is 
therefore to be favoured. However, as long as an English opt in is not 
present the scission system survives. 
 
Another discrepancy is clawback that intends to bring back gifts made by 
the deceased before death to be distributed to the heirs. In England, the 
deceased’s estate does not include property that has been disposed of by 
gifts and the courts will not consider a claim of clawback even if it is 
included in the law they are applying. This reflects the fundamental 
principle of testamentary freedom in English law, a principle that England is 
not willing to abandon. 
 
Furthermore, the Regulation uses habitual residence as the main connecting 
factor, while in England, conflict of law rules are based on domicile. Even if 
England does not adopt the Regulation, English citizens will still be affected 
by the Regulation as those English citizens resident in a Member State 
would be subject to the concept of habitual residence, as the courts must 
apply the Regulation to everyone who is resident in their territory. 
 
Due to the universal character of the Regulation a non opt in by England 
would lead to legal uncertainty, less predictability and higher costs for legal 
advice for citizens planning cross-border successions with a connection to 
England and other Member States as well as for those entitled to a share of 
the deceased’s estate. A non opt in by England would therefore be likely to 
negatively affect cross-border successions involving English citizens as well 
as cross-border successions involving citizens of other Member States. 
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Sammanfattning 
England har i dagsläget beslutat att ej anta den förslagna EU- förordningen 
om behörighet, tillämplig lag, erkännande och verkställighet av domar och 
officiella handlingar i samband med arv och om inrättandet av ett europeiskt 
arvsintyg. England deltar dock i de pågående förhandlingarna mellan 
medlemsstaterna rörande förordningen och en ratificering är fortfarande 
möjlig. Enligt England omfattar huvudfrågorna i förordningen 
anknytningskriteriet habitual residence och effekten av utländska clawback 
regimer. Anknytningskriteriet i förordningen skiljer sig avsevärt från det 
tillämpade i England och om England ej antar förordningen kommer dessa 
regler att existera sida vid sida. 
 
De engelska lagvalsreglerna bygger på ett system där en uppdelning görs 
mellan lös egendom som regleras av Englands svar på hemvistlandets lag, 
domicile, och fast egendom som regleras av lagen i det land där egendomen 
befinner sig. Detta skiljer sig från förordningen som tillämpar ett enhetligt 
system, där endast en lag tillämpas på egendomen i dess helhet. Det 
engelska systemet har kritiserats under en längre tid för att vara orättvist och 
orimligt då olika lagar tillämpas på egendom som är belägen i olika 
medlemsstater men som tillhör samma person. Ett enhetligt system, likt det 
valda i förordningen, är därför att föredra men så länge England ej antar 
förordningen kvartstår systemet med en uppdelning mellan lös och fast 
egendom. 
 
Ett annat problem rör clawback som avser återföring av gåvor till den 
avlidnes dödsbo som den avlidne givet under sin livstid, för distribution till 
den avlidnes arvingar. Enligt Englands arvsrätt räknas ej egendom som 
givits bort in i den avlidnes dödsbo och de engelska domstolarna beaktar ej 
spörsmål rörande clawback. Detta återspeglar den engelska grundläggande 
principen om testamentsfrihet, en princip som England ännu ej är beredd att 
överge. 
 
Även om England inte antar förordningen kommer engelska medborgare 
påverkas av den om de omfattas av begreppet habitual residence, då 
förordningsstaterna måste tillämpa förordningen på alla bosatta inom dess 
territorium. Dessutom påverkas medborgare med hemvist i en 
förordningsstat och som har tillgångar i England på ett negativt sätt då de 
blir underkastade två rättssystem. 
 
På grund av förordningens universella karaktär åtföljs ett utanförskap för 
England av rättsosäkerhet, mindre förutsägbarhet samt högre juridiska 
rådgivningskostnader för de personer involverade i gränsöverskridande 
arvsfrågor. Ett utanförskap skulle därför sannolikt påverka den 
gränsöverskridande arvsrätten negativt både för engelska medborgare och 
medborgare i förordningsstater. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The increasing mobility within the EU has led to a growing number of 
people crossing the borders; living, working and owning property in other 
Member States.1 Every Member State has private international law rules 
that vary fundamentally, determining what their conflict of law rules should 
be. The laws of the Member States can give rise to different answers to the 
question of which court is to deal with a cross-border succession, and the 
possibility that more than one could, by its own law, have jurisdiction to do 
so.2 When a person connected to more than one Member State dies, it is 
necessary to determine which of the Member States’ law that should govern 
the succession.3
 
 
A European instrument regarding succession has been sought for some 
considerable time, but all previous attempts have been unsuccessful. The 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession on Estates of 
Deceased Persons of 1989 has been the most ambitious attempt at 
harmonisation. It covers the major issues relating to the law of succession, 
but the Member States provided little support. Many Member States did not 
want to replace their conflict of law rules for a harmonised convention; only 
the Netherlands ratified the convention.4
 
   
Succession is not included in the private international law instruments 
adopted by the Community so far. With transnational successions increasing 
it is clear that harmonised European rules on this issue should be addressed. 
In March 2005, the European Commission5 issued a Green Paper on 
succession and wills6
 
, to fill the shortage. 
The Commission observed that harmonisation of substantive law in the 
Member States is not possible; instead the focus has to be on the conflict of 
law rules. Further, the Commission concluded that settling the question of 
applicable law is of priority as this would facilitate the progress on 
succession, as well as the free movement of people within the Community.7
 
   
                                               
1 Member State indicates membership of the European Union as well as Members of the 
proposed Regulation. 
2 COM (2005) 65. 
3 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p.8. 
4 Harris, (2008), p.183. 
5 The European Commission indicates, Commission of the European Communities, and 
will hereinafter be referred to as the “Commission”. 
6 COM (2005) 65. Green Paper on succession and wills will hereinafter be referred to as 
“Green Paper” 
7 COM (2005) 65. 
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The Green Paper applies to succession to a deceased’s estate, covering all 
property transmissions as a result of death. It establishes common rules that 
the Member States have to follow to determine which Member States’ law 
should apply to the cross-border succession where the deceased has assets in 
more than one Member State, as well as which Member States’ courts have 
the competence to determine the succession.8
 
 
In late 2005 the Commission appointed an expert group of solicitors and 
professors with the intention of composing a proposal in the light of the 
responses to the Green Paper received. This proposal was presented by the 
Commission on 14 October 2009 and shall enter into force on the twentieth 
day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union 
and apply from one year after the date of its entry into force.9
 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and illustrate the current 
approach to the core issues surrounding the proposed Regulation from a 
critical English perspective. My intention is to identify and clarify these 
issues as well as critically examine why a non opt in decision by England 
was expected and to analyse the consequences that follow. In order to 
achieve this purpose a comparative study will be conducted in order to 
explore and analyse the discrepancy of the rules of the Regulation and the 
conflict of law rules in England. This comparative study has the aim of 
comparing an opt in to a non opt in, to accomplish the purpose of analysing 
and demonstrating the consequence of England’s decision.    
 
1.3 Methods and material 
To accomplish the purpose of this thesis in a satisfactory way various 
methods have been used which consist of descriptive, comparative and 
analytical approaches. 
 
Overall, the subject matter of this thesis has necessitated the use of 
international sources as well as domestic with regard to both English 
literature and English case law. This area of law has not been introduced in 
any previous instruments at Union level, and consequently the amount of 
literature and national acts provided is limited. Thanks to my Erasmus 
exchange year at Kingston University, London I have had access to public 
legal bodies in England as well as other sources of law. 
 
Particular emphasis has been placed on analysing the Green Paper, the Draft 
Regulation and the preparatory work from the European Parliament and the 
                                               
8 Harris, (2008), p.184. 
9 COM (2009)154 article 51. 
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Commission along with a detailed account of a number of consultation 
papers and responses. English doctrine and law review articles by 
professional scholars have also been highlighted in addition to English 
authorities such as the House of Lords and the Ministry of Justice, since 
these are the primary sources of information when examining this field of 
law. 
 
It should be noted that most scholars are practitioners of English law and 
therefore adopt an English supporting perspective. It has, as a result, been 
difficult to find as many arguments in support of the Regulation, outside the 
preparatory work of the Regulation, as non-supportive arguments. 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis is structured so as to first outline the English response to the 
Green Paper and to show the critical evaluation of the Regulation from the 
English point of view in Chapter 2. In the following Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 
some of the core issues of the Regulation are introduced; applicable law, 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement with their various concepts 
highlighting the movable and immovable property, the connecting factor of 
habitual residence, clawback  and the administration of estate. This is 
accompanied by a brief descriptive presentation of the English conflict of 
law rules with emphasis on the connecting factor of domicile in Chapter 3. 
This outline will present the reader with a sense of the context in which the 
term domicile exists. This presentation also explores one of the most important 
principles in English inheritance law, namely the testamentary freedom in 
Chapter 4. These chapters are based on a comparative method, dealing with 
the concepts both as established in the Regulation and in the English 
inheritance law. 
 
Within the framework established above, the preceding findings are applied 
to an analysis in Chapter 7, illustrating the consequences of an opt in 
decision by England compared to a non opt in. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
Because of the substantial number of issues surrounding the Regulation, this 
thesis is unable to address every issue raised or question posed. Focus has 
therefore been aimed at the main themes that have emerged. Hence, in order 
to present a comprehensive and sufficient picture of the English viewpoint 
of the Regulation this thesis contains an analysis of the core issues of the 
Regulation. These concepts together create a suitable foundation to conduct 
further analysis of the controversies surrounding the Regulation from the 
English perspective. 
 
It should be noted that this thesis only focuses on an evaluation of the rules 
of England and not regimes of other regions within the UK. The differences 
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between the English system and the regimes of other regions within the UK 
lie primarily in substantive succession laws. While the succession laws in 
England and Wales and Northern Ireland are widely similar, succession laws 
in Scotland are based on civilian tradition and differ from the common law 
based rules, in particular as to the extent to which a person is free to direct 
the distribution of his estate without challenges from members of his family. 
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2 The proposed EU Regulation 
2.1 The English response 
The House of Lords10 reconsidered the Green Paper in October 2007 after 
the first consideration in 2005 shortly after the Green Paper had been issued. 
During this time, the English position was much more sceptical towards it 
while the House of Lords in 2005 stated; “... We are not convinced that 
action in family law matters is required to the extent proposed by the Hague 
Programme. Supplying the individuals concerned with more and better 
information on their rights under the laws of Member States may be a more 
effective way of addressing cross-border issues than EU legislation. We 
believe that such avenues should be explored before embarking on the very 
ambitious legislative agenda set out in the Hague Programme.” 11 When the 
House of Lords reconsidered the proposal in October 2007, they gave a 
more positive response. Here it was observed that, although the Commission 
had not produced the most convincing case for an instrument at Union level, 
there are in fact an increasing number of English citizens holding assets, 
working and owning homes in other Member States. This points to a need 
for greater and more detailed legal certainty within this area of law. 
However, the response is not without objections from the House of Lords, 
who states that: “It is important to ensure that an EU instrument, suitably 
qualified or flexible in its provisions, would provide real practical benefits 
to UK citizen.”12
 
 
The English13 response to the Green Paper stressed that the differences in 
the Members States’ legal systems may make the achievement of 
harmonised conflict of law rules difficult.14
                                               
10 House of Lords indicates, House of Lords, European Union Committee on EU law and 
will hereinafter be referred to as “The House of Lords”. 
 England has the view that the 
Member States’ different range of legal traditions must be entirely respected. 
This is essential because the Member States’ different ways of approaching 
the transfer of property on death are fundamental. Like England, some 
Member States favour freedom of testamentary disposition, while others 
provide for compulsory heirship. The share allocated to the surviving spouse 
is a question that gives rise to the largest number of succession proceedings 
because of the conflict of interest involved. The allocation of this share 
differs significantly from country to country. Some countries place the 
spouse in the same position as a surviving child, which differs from Italy for 
example where the surviving spouse is entitled to a certain reserved portion, 
11 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 10th Report of Session 2004- 5, p. 60-63. 
12 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2007-8, p. 11. 
13 “The English” indicates The English Government and will hereinafter be referred to as 
“England” or “English”. 
14 Ibid. p.6. 
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whereas in Belgium the spouse is only granted a limited life interest.15  
Furthermore, England – amongst others – practices a so called court based 
system, where, at the time of death ownership of the deceased's property is 
given to a third party, who is entrusted with the administration of estate and 
the distribution to the beneficiaries, while some other countries allow the 
property to pass directly to the heirs. Some Member States include gifts 
made by the deceased during his lifetime and others like England define the 
estate as the property of the deceased at the time of death. This is a fully 
legitimate diversity, which limits the extent to which any harmonisation 
proposed by European instruments could be accepted. Even if England were 
to have a positive attitude to a limited harmonisation that would bring 
benefits to the citizens, it considers that there is very little scope for being 
able to create such harmonisation in the field of succession.16
 
 
2.2 Impact assessment 
According to the European Parliament,17 at the time the Green Paper was 
issued there were 50,000-100,000 transnational successions opened per year 
in the EU; a number that rises with the accession of new Member States. 
Furthermore, the national differences only make it costlier and harder for 
heirs to take possession of the estate.18
 
 
The majority of the responses to the Green Paper were positive to a private 
international law instrument within the area of succession, and many had the 
view that the legal justification is almost self-evident.19 However, despite a 
more positive response, the English response in 2007 pointed to the fact that 
there is no hard evidence as to the need for a Regulation.20
 
 
England has a strong view that any proposal should be developed after 
thorough analysis of the problems with existing law. Any proposal at Union 
level must flow from such an analysis and be justified by clear evidence that 
the proposal offers proportionate solutions which cannot be addressed at 
national level. It suggests that the Green Paper does not contain such clear 
evidence. The fact that there appear to be around 50,000- 100,000 
transnational succession cases each year does not provide evidence that this 
action is necessary to justify legislation. England stressed that the 
Commission has to identify the real problems and justify proposed changes 
                                               
15 Jenard Report [1979] OJ C59/1. 
 16Harris, (2008), p. 186. 
 17European Parliament indicates European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and will 
hereinafter be referred to as “European Parliament”.  
18 Explanatory Statement in the Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs of 16 October 
2006 endorsed by the Parliament (2005/2148(INI)), para 1. 
19 The responses to the Green Paper can be found here: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_public/successions/news_ 
contributions_successions_en.htm 
20 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2007-8, p. 15 and 
Harris, (2008), p. 187. 
 
11 
 
before England can accept the Commission's view as to the need for a 
reform.21
 
 
The harmonisation of private international law has never previously been 
attempted on a scale like this. Notwithstanding the failure to create a 
harmonisation of law rules on succession with the Hague Succession 1989, 
the Commission appears to attempt to cover the full range of private 
international law- jurisdiction, recognition of foreign judgements and choice 
of law, notarial acts, as well as the introduction of a European Certificate of 
Succession and Register of wills.22 England considers this as too much and 
too soon, which may lead to the collapse of the whole Regulation. England 
maintains that a single project is unworkable and suggests that the 
Commission proceeds with a smaller examination of separate areas.23
 
 
 
                                               
21 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2007-8, p. 15. 
22 Harris, (2008), p. 189. 
23 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2007-8, p.17. 
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3 Applicable law 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most essential questions of the Regulation is what the law 
applicable to the succession should be. Courts are not obliged to apply their 
own State’s law, thus they may apply the law of another State. For that 
reason, the Member States have adopted their own conflict of law rules to 
decide which state’s law should be applied to which case. These rules may 
differ from each other and several Member States may be competent to deal 
with a given case where they may come to different results. This does not 
only lead to a major factor of legal uncertainty, but does also have severe 
consequences on the mutual recognition of judgements between Member 
States.24
 
 
3.2 Movable and immovable property 
One of the main discrepancies between the Member States’ conflict of law 
rules is whether a unitary system should govern the whole estate or whether 
there should be separate conflict of law rules depending on the type of 
property.25
 
 
Seventeen Member States have a unitary system where both immovable and 
movable property is subject to a single law, regardless of where it is located, 
whereas ten Member States have a system based on scission where 
immovable and movable property located in different states may be subject 
to different laws. According to this, movable property is subject to the 
connecting factor, which mainly is the last habitual residence, nationality or 
domicile, whilst the immovable property is governed by the law of the 
country where it is located.26
 
 
At present, England has a scission approach whereby the English private 
international law rules determining the law applicable to the succession 
make a distinction between immovable and movable property. Immovable 
property is governed by the law of the place in which the property is 
located, lex situs, and movable property by the law of the deceased’s 
domicile at the time of death. This approach is adopted after the idea that the 
deceased is generally most connected to the State where he resided. Lex 
situs is also used to determine whether something is an immovable or a 
movable object. 27
                                               
24 SEC(2009) 410, p. 11. 
 
25 Harris, (2008), p. 207. 
26 SEC(2009) 410, p. 12. 
27 Harris, (2008), p. 207. 
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This approach is not without detractors and the scission approach has been 
under a great deal of criticism by English legal scholars. The key problem is 
that two different laws will be applied separately to determine the 
succession of property located in different States but belonging to the same 
deceased, without fitting in with each other. This will cause distribution that 
is unfair and unreasonable. It is not hard to envisage family members being 
denied protection or being excessively enriched.28
 
 
The approach of a unitary system in the Regulation will lead to unity 
regarding the transmission of succession and will abandon the frequent use 
of a scission system. 29
 
 A unitary system is therefore to be favoured, but due 
to the English non opt in the scission system continues. 
3.3 Domicile 
The English courts apply the common law test of domicile at the time of 
death; hence, the lex domicilii is favoured as the connecting factor for all 
aspects of status and capacity for parties who are involved in disputes 
concerning the distribution of the deceased’s estate.30 There are three 
different concepts of domicile raised at different points in time in a person’s 
life. In common law legal systems, every citizen obtains a domicile of origin 
at birth, which is that of his or her father.31 Throughout their minority, 
children have domicile of dependency which follows the domicile of the 
parents.32
 
 After reaching the age of majority, an individual can choose a new 
domicile, the domicile of choice. To establish domicile a long-term 
residence accompanied by an intention to remain in the country indefinitely 
has to be presented. 
3.3.1 Long-term residence 
A long-term residence requires an actual residence in the country. This 
requirement is seen as a permanent residence and thus the residence does 
not have to be formal.33 The English court ruled in the case IRC v. Duchess 
of Portland that,”…residence in a country for the purpose of the law of 
domicile is physical presence in that country as an inhabitant of it”.34
 
 
                                               
28 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), p. 121. 
29 Rea Rea [1902] 1 I.R. 45.1 
30 European-Justice and Home Affairs, 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/publications/docs/report_conflits_uk.pdf, p.4. 
31 Udny v. Udny (1869) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441. 
32 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), Rule. 156-158..   
33 White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).   
34  IRC v. Duchess of Portland [1982] Ch 314 s. 318-319.   
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The duration of the residence is not crucial as long as the necessary 
intention is apparent.35 Furthermore, a real connection has to exist between 
the individual and the country for residence to be established. It is not 
enough to establish oneself in a country just to achieve a specific purpose, 
e.g. education.36 If an individual is resident in more than one country, he is 
considered to be domiciled in the country where he has his primary home, 
chief residence.37
 
   
In order to determine whether a new domicile has been acquired, the 
duration of the residence is not essential and other factors play an equally 
important part in assessing the true nature of the residence. The English 
High Court has found that the test for whether residence is enough to 
establish domicile is "a qualitative as well as a quantitative test”.38
 
 
3.3.2 Intention to remain indefinitely 
Intention to remain indefinitely is difficult to determine and is the one factor 
that gives rise to the most disputes, as it is both ambiguous and hard to 
prove.39
 
 
Residence that is only intended for a limited time or for a specific purpose is 
not satisfactory as the intention must be for a permanent or indefinite 
residence. The resident must be, “…fixed not for a limited period or 
particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation.”40 
Furthermore, the intention shall be for residence in one country only for this 
requirement to be met.41
 
 
When the courts try to determine a person’s intention they do not only rely 
upon what the person asserts, but also takes into account every aspect of the 
person’s life which may be important to find out the individual’s genuine 
intention. 
 
3.4 Habitual residence 
The connecting factors used by the Member States to determine the 
applicable law to the succession are quite different. There is specially a 
difference between Member States who apply the law of the last habitual 
                                               
35 White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).   
36 Qureshi v. Qureshi [1972] Fam. 173.   
37 Plummer v. IRC [1988] 1 All ER 97, [1988] 1 WLR 292.   
38 Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] AC 588, s. 598.   
39 Clarkson, Jaffey and Hill, (2006), p. 38.   
40 Udny v. Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & Div 441, s. 458.   
41 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), p. 128.   
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residence of the deceased and others who apply the principle of domicile or 
nationality. 42
 
 
The Regulation envisages a single connecting factor of habitual residence to 
determine the applicable law to apply to the succession as a whole. 
According to article 16 of the Regulation, the law of the Member State 
where the deceased had his habitual residence at the time of death shall be 
applicable to the succession.43 However, the connecting factor of habitual 
residence has been criticised as it is not currently clearly defined and may 
therefore be interpreted differently in the Member States. The only criterion 
for its determination which is given by the Regulation is the mentioning that 
it should coincide with the deceased’s “centre of interest”.44 If England 
decides to opt into the Regulation, there would be great changes to its 
existing legal system regarding the connecting factor. However, although 
the English private international law rules are based on domicile and not 
habitual residence this is not an unknown concept in England. The term has 
been introduced in various EU Regulations and Hague Conventions 45, 
several of which England has adhered to.46
 
 
According to the ECJ47 in the case C-523/07, habitual residence is 
equivalent to the place which “reflected some degree of integration by the 
child in a social and family environment.” The following aspects have to be 
considered: the extent of the stay, regularity, the child’s nationality, 
linguistic knowledge, the family’s move to the Member State and the 
circumstances and reasons for the stay in a Member State as well as the 
family and social relationships of the child in the State. The national courts 
have to take all the circumstances specific to each individual case into 
account to establish the habitual residence of the person.48
 
  
A definition of habitual residence has also been considered by the English 
High Court in matrimonial proceedings in the case of Marinos v Marinos 
where the court set out guiding principles to be used in difficult situations: 
 
• EU habitual residence should be defined by an individual’s 
main interest instead of by the length of the individual’s residence; 
 
                                               
42 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2nd Report of Session 2007- 8, p. 12. 
43 Article 16 of the Regulation.   
44 COM(2009) 154, p.12, in relation to article 16 of the Regulation. 
45 See the definition in article 19 para. 1 subpara. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) and article 23 para. 2 
of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II) and Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial 
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 
(Brussels IIbis). 
46 Frimston, (2009), p. 4. 
47 The ECJ indicates the European Court of Justice. 
48 C-523/07, ECJ, 2 April 2009. 
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• Even if an individual is resident in more than one State at the 
same time he can only have one EU habitual residence at any time; 
 
• EU habitual residence can be lost and gained in the same day, 
thus in the same manner as a change in domicile.49
 
 
Despite this, the term habitual residence has been criticised by England for 
being the only connecting factor of the Regulation and for lacking 
definition. England has also disapproved that the ECJ may subsequently 
clarify the concept. It can be seen that the definition of habitual residence in 
various Regulations only relates to the relevant subject matter of that 
specific Regulation and would therefore not be transferable to the 
Regulation on succession and wills. The extent of connection that is 
considered appropriate may be less significant under one Regulation than 
under another.50Furthermore, England has criticised the fact that the use of 
habitual residence as a single connecting factor “could subject the estates of 
individuals, either on short-term secondments overseas or otherwise without 
a sufficiently substantial connection with a particular legal system, to that 
system’s law of succession if they were to die whilst resident in the country 
in question”,51
 
 even if they intended to return to another Member State at 
the end of their secondments. 
The connecting factor of domicile requires a significant connection with the 
country of residence and helps identify the jurisdiction in relation to the 
Member State where an individual intends to stay, while the connecting 
factor of habitual residence has outcomes which would be inappropriate and 
may contradict the expectations of the deceased and their families. 
According to England, habitual residence does not provide for a significant 
degree of connection to a Member State.52 However nor can one expect that 
the common law test of domicile will be preserved or that the connecting 
factor of nationality would be preferred against the habitual residence. A 
person’s nationality may not have any direct connection with the place 
where the deceased’s life was centred or with his assets. Furthermore, the 
fact is that the common law test of domicile is little known in other Member 
States. It may also lead to curious results; for example a person born in one 
Member State may live in another one for all his life but prior to death 
return to the place of birth and retain domicile there on the basis of a vague 
intention to return for a short amount of time.53
 
 Furthermore, the English 
definition of domicile differs from definitions in other Member States and 
has a lot of vagueness attached; thus a reform of the existing law of 
domicile is urgently needed in any event.   
                                               
49 Marinos v Marinos [2007] EWHC 2047. 
50 Minister's Letter (Lord Bach) of 17 December 2009. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Minister's Letter (Lord Bach) of 14 December 2009. 
53 Harris, (2008), p. 210. 
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3.5 Freedom to choose the applicable law 
As an alternative to article 16 of the Regulation, individuals have some 
degree of freedom to choose the applicable law by will, through article 17 of 
the Regulation. The article makes it possible for individuals to choose the 
law of their own nationality to apply to the succession as a whole. The 
choice has to be expressed and included in a declaration in the form of 
disposition of property upon death.54 At present, there is no such freedom 
under English law. The only situation where party autonomy is accepted in 
the English conflict of law rules on succession concerns the interpretation of 
wills.55
 
 
Article17 of the Regulation would be a novelty under English law and 
although it can be seen as an article strengthening the legal certainty for 
individuals, the reference to nationality alone has consequences for England 
that has a system based on domicile. This has however been considered and 
it appears from recital 32 of the Regulation that domicile can be used as an 
alternative to nationality in Member States with a system like England based 
on domicile.56
 
 
Article 22 of the Regulation proposes another aspect of the choice of law 
rules which appears to be more problematic. The article is an exception to 
Article 17 of the Regulation and concerns special succession regimes. These 
are defined as regimes “to which certain immovable property enterprises, 
enterprises or other special categories of property are subjected by the law 
of Member State in which they are located on account of their economic, 
family or social purpose where, according to that law, this regime is 
applicable irrespective of the law governing the succession.”57
 
 
In their consultation paper, the Ministry of Justice describes this exception 
as uncertain and widely drawn which makes it likely to create legal 
uncertainty as to what law should be applied.58
                                               
54 Article 17 (2) of the Regulation. 
 
55 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), Rule 147. 
56 Recital 32 of the Regulation. 
57 Article 22 of the Regulation. 
58 Ministry of Justice, (2009), p. 40, recital 36. 
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4 CLAWBACK 
4.1 Introduction 
Many difficulties facing England are based on a difference of understanding 
what matters are included within the word “succession”. This issue arises 
from the English wish to distinguish the term “succession” from 
“administration of estates” as well as the English conception of what assets 
are part of the deceased’s estate. Perhaps the most important issue in the 
proposal facing England, is the one of “clawback”.59
 
 One of the main issues 
of clawback is the imposition of a compulsory inheritance provision that 
limits the English tradition of testamentary freedom. 
4.2 The English tradition of testamentary 
freedom 
Unlike many legal systems in the EU, the English legal system recognises 
that the testator may dispose of his estate exactly as he wishes. The freedom 
of testamentary disposition is in theory unrestricted which is primarily 
provided for in the Wills Act 1837.60 “It shall be lawful for every person to 
devise, bequeath or dispose of, by his will, executed in the manner 
hereinafter required, all real estate and all personal estate, which he shall 
be entitled to, either at law of in equity at the time of his death…”61
 
 
Previously, the absolute testamentary freedom for the testator resulted in 
disinheritance of family and dependants of the testator by his will. If valid, 
the testator was free to determine who his heirs would be and avoid the 
compulsory heirship, which has been well debated. Due to this the 
Inheritance (Family Provisions) Act 1938 and later the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, promulgated in England. 
The latter allows dependants of the testator to obtain reasonable provisions 
of the deceased’s estate if the will does not give them such provisions. The 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 includes 
family members and individuals who depend on the deceased financially.62
 
 
Even though the Wills Act 1837 allows unrestricted freedom for the testator 
to dispose of his property it can be seen from the foregoing that this freedom 
is practically restricted by subsequent enactments. So one wonders if the 
testamentary freedom is just an illusion. 
 
                                               
59 Harris, (2008), p. 196. 
60 Short Title “The Wills Act 1837” given by Short titles Act 1896 (c. 14). 
61 Section 3 grants the testator unrestricted power of testation. 
62 The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 191, p. 1-2. 
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4.3 The effect of clawback and 
compulsory inheritance 
Under article 19(2) (j) of the Regulation, clawback claims are included in 
the scope of the applicable law of succession “...any obligation to restore or 
account for gifts and the taking of them into account when determining the 
shares of heir...” 63
 
  and would therefore become enforceable within 
England. 
Clawback arises when gifts are made during lifetime, inter vivos. An heir 
benefiting from a compulsory inheritance is able to claim gifts or trusts 
made by the deceased during his lifetime. The term clawback intends to 
bring back gifts made by the deceased under certain conditions; the gifts 
should be brought back to the estate leaving it to be distributed to the 
heirs.64
 
 In England, there is no compulsory inheritance and thus, no 
clawback. Nor will the courts consider a claim of clawback even if it is 
included in the law they are applying. 
The problem of clawback for England does not seem to be shared by other 
Member States. In England, the deceased’s estate does not include property 
that has been validly disposed of by gifts, trustees or companies during the 
lifetime of the deceased. Several other Member States include gifts made by 
the deceased during his lifetime;  hence, inter vivos transactions may be 
brought back into the estate to ensure that there are sufficient funds to 
allocate to the heirs.65 Consequently, there is a considerably greater legal 
stability in property ownership in England compared to the Member States 
where clawback claims may be made. This reflects the fundamental 
principle of testamentary freedom in English law, which places the 
importance of an individual’s freedom to make transactions and alienate 
property above the protection of the family members’ interest.66
 
 
The Law Society and STEP67
                                               
63 COM(2009)154. 
 compiled a joint response stating that the 
protection of inter vivos transaction in England is a fundamental property 
law right that should not be undermined by clawback and the requirement 
that lifetime gifts has to be overturned to provide for fix shares of the 
deceased’s estate. In many civil law jurisdictions, the civil heirs may claim 
for compensation for the property that is given to the asset holder. These 
claims are not recognised in common law systems and in England it is only 
the property owned at the time of death which may be subject to the claims 
of heirs whether under common or civil law. To allow heirs to overturn inter 
64 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 25. 
65 Harris, (2008), p. 196. 
66 Ministry of Justice, (2009), p. 51. 
67 STEP indicates Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners.  
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vivos transactions made lawfully by the deceased in a common law system 
would lead to great confusion, uncertainty and unfairness.68
 
  
The conditions for which clawback operates vary significantly from 
Member State to Member State. Still it is to be found in most legal systems 
in the EU. One of the main differences in operating the clawback regime 
includes the time within which a claim for clawback may be made.69 In 
Germany, there is a time limit of 10 years and in Austria, the limit is 2 years. 
In the Netherlands, the clawback is a monetary claim with a time limit of 5 
years before death and only for gifts to non-heirs. In France, there is no time 
limit and the claim is like in the Netherlands- monetary instead of a claim to 
the assets themselves.70 As can be seen in the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975, a gift can be made undone in England 
under some circumstances, and thus clawback does exist in theory. 
According to the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 
1975 a gift made within 6 years of death and with the intention to defeat a 
claim can be set aside.71
 
 This can be compared to the effect of clawback in 
most continental jurisdictions, which can be a reason to consider if 
clawback actually presents a problem for England or not. 
It is inevitable that England is not the only Member State that needs to find 
a solution for this problem. Since different legal systems have different time 
limits beyond which gifts can not be challenged and different ways of 
assessing compensation claims, whether it is to look at the value at the time 
of death or the value of the gift at the date it was made, the uncertainty 
would be multiplied.72 England may have to apply foreign laws of 
succession that can go back several years before the deceased’s death to 
determine what assets form part of the deceased’s estate. This erodes the 
security of inter vivos transactions and represents a retrograde step.73
 
 
The introduction of clawback in England via the inclusion of the obligation 
to restore or account for gifts in the Regulation could affect the fundamental 
right of the deceased to bequeath parts of his or her property. This could 
create great practical problems, particularly for the recipients of such gifts 
including charities. From the English perspective it is not acceptable that a 
donee, having received a gift during the lifetime of the deceased, cannot be 
certain that it will not be claimed back by the heirs if the donor changes his 
habitual residence after the gift has been made.74 The impact of the 
Regulation on this point must also be seen from the perspective of the 
English trust industry where trusts enable the creation of different forms of 
estate to be transferred to the following generations.75
                                               
68 The Law Society and STEP, (2007), p. 2. 
 
69 Ibid, p. 25-27. 
70 Frimston, (2009), p. 6-7. 
71 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 16. 
72 Ibid and Harris, (2008), p. 197. 
73 Harris, p. 197-198. 
74 See the Minister's Letter (Lord Bach) of 17 December 2009. 
75 Harris, (2008), p. 365. 
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The House of Lords argued in its 6th report that the freedom for individuals 
to dispose of their property as they wish is of legal tradition in England. 
With this comes a strong belief in a cultural heritage and the providing for 
trusts, which plays an important role in England. Furthermore, the effect of 
clawback could be alleviated if testators were allowed to choose a law such 
as the English that does not include clawback to apply to their estate. The 
Regulation only suggests a choice of the testator’s nationality at the time of 
death; thus it is not possible for an individual who does not have the 
nationality of a Member State that excludes clawback to choose this 
mechanism.76
 
  
For England, the most suitable solution would be to argue for an 
autonomous definition of the term “estate of the deceased” that excludes 
property lawfully overturned during the deceased’s lifetime and in addition, 
to clarify that compensation claims for such property do not fall within the 
scope of the Regulation. An autonomous interpretation would lead to a 
uniform instrument and the European institutions ask for an autonomous 
definition of almost every term in other European Regulations so it may be 
asked why such an interpretation should not be made here.77 However, an 
autonomous definition does not seem to be a priority for the European 
institutions regarding what assets should form part of the deceased’s estate. 
Thus, it is up to the governing law to decide and in turn the application of 
the Regulation is left even more unpredictable.78
 
 
Despite the foregoing, the inclusion of gifts made during the deceased’s 
lifetime within the whole estate is part of most Member States’ succession 
laws and England is the exception.79 Current English conflict of law rules 
may already lead to the application of a foreign law with rules of 
compulsory inheritance.80
 
 Conversely, concerned that family members and 
dependants may be disinherited if the applicable law to the succession is 
that of a jurisdiction with no compulsory heirship protection, it is possible 
that other jurisdictions just as the English one, will push for rules that do not 
undermine their existing course of action. It is likely that some Member 
States will be concerned about the fact that the English rules avoid 
compulsory inheritance and demand a rule enabling some form of protection 
for family members and dependants. 
After having decided not to opt in, England confirms that it is at this point 
not willing to find compromises acceptable to other Member States but it 
may have to give way to the unfettered application of its own law in foreign 
courts.81
                                               
76 With the exception of the vague mentioning of domicile in recital 32 of the Regulation. 
House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 22. 
 
77 See Brussels I where almost every term is defined autonomous, including succession and 
wills 
78 Harris, (2008), p. 198. 
79 Ibid, (2008), p. 199. 
80 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 15. 
81 Harris, (2008), p. 201. 
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5 JURISDICTION 
5.1 Introduction 
This area of law is another problematic aspect of the Regulation. It may be 
seen as less important than the problems attached to the connecting factor 
and the problems of clawback, but it may nevertheless be of importance for 
an overall assessment as to whether or not an opt in by England would be in 
the national interest. 
5.2 The Regulation and the English 
perspective 
The question of which court has jurisdiction is different from the question of 
which law is applicable to the succession. According to article 4 in the 
Regulation, the general rule is that the courts of the Member State in which 
the deceased had his habitual residence at the time of death have the 
jurisdiction to settle matters of succession.82 The deceased’s habitual 
residence is in principle the central element, whether or not immovable or 
movable property located abroad is involved.83
 
 
Where the deceased has chosen another Member State’s law to be applicable 
to the succession according to article 17, the jurisdiction stays with the court 
of the Member State of habitual residence but the court may invite the 
parties concerned to use the court of the deceased’s nationality under article 
5 of the Regulation, if they consider this to be a more suitable form, 
professio juris.84
 
 
Furthermore article 6 of the Regulation provides for a residual basis of 
jurisdiction for cases where the deceased had no habitual residence in a 
Member State to which the Regulation applies. Residual jurisdiction can 
only apply on succession property located in a Member State and when the 
following 4 situations occur: a) if the deceased had his earlier habitual 
residence in that State within the last five years before the court has been 
seised; b) if the deceased had the nationality of that State at the time of 
death; c) if an heir has his habitual residence in that State; or d) if the claim 
relates solely to property located in that State. These situations have to be 
examined in chronological order and are not to be seen as alternative 
situations in which a competence can be justified but follow a hierarchical 
system. Just the location of succession property in a Member State is 
therefore not sufficient to establish jurisdiction unless this is the last resort. 
                                               
82Article 4 of the Regulation 
83See Recital 12 of the Regulation     
84Ministry of Justice s, (2009), p. 11. recital 28 and House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 30. 
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If this is the case, the court’s competence is limited to the devolution of the 
succession property.85
 
 
According to English law the jurisdiction is not exclusive as it offers the 
courts of domicile jurisdiction to determine the succession to all the 
deceased’s movable property regardless of where it is located. Furthermore, 
the English courts will follow the foreign courts decisions if they have been 
seised. In these cases the connecting factor is domicile and not habitual 
residence, the former requires a closer local and temporal connection to the 
State of residence.86 Regarding immovable property the jurisdiction is 
determined by lex situs, thus courts of a Member State in which the property 
is located are competent to determine the succession to all property located 
there. The deceased’s domicile does not affect the jurisdiction.87
 
   
In English law there is no provision providing for an optional referral by the 
English courts to another Member States court of nationality in cases of 
professio juris. However according to English law the jurisdiction is not 
exclusive. Even if the English courts have jurisdiction they may declare 
themselves forum non conveniens if they find another court more 
appropriate to deal with the subject matter.88
 
 
5.3 Administration of estate 
The English law only includes a few rules relating to international 
jurisdiction in succession cases and draws a clear distinction between the 
administration of estate and devolution of the estate. 
 
The European institutions however, appear to have a preference for a very 
wide-ranging Regulation. The law applicable to the succession would apply 
to all matters concerning the devolution of the estate, thus it is very likely to 
extend the application of this law to the administration of the estate. This 
would mean that the status of those entitled to distribute the deceased’s 
estate by foreign law would have to be recognised in England and that the 
powers that they have by that foreign law may be exercised in England.89
 
 
The European Parliament considers that “the law specified in the legislative 
act to be adopted should be competent to cover, regardless of the nature and 
location of the estate, the whole succession, from the beginning of the 
procedure to the transmission of the inheritance to the persons entitled'”.90
                                               
85 COM(2009)154. 
 
The European Parliament goes on to say that the Regulation should provide: 
86 Mark v Mark, [2005] 2 FLR, 1193. 
87 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), Rule. 31(2). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Harris, (2008), p. 190. 
90 Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs, P6-TA(2006)0469, Recommendation, 6.1. 
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“... rules of private international law to ensure effective coordination 
between legal systems with regard to the administration, liquidation and 
transmission of estates, as well as identification of heirs, with provisions 
stating: that these aspects of succession,… are to be regulated by the law 
applicable to the succession…”.91
 
 
It is very unlikely that England would be prepared to accept any changes to 
its measure of administration of estate.92 The English courts have no 
jurisdiction to decide the succession to a deceased’s estate unless a personal 
representative has been constituted before the court. Either this 
representative can be an executor named in the deceased’s will or an 
administrator appointed by the court if there is no will. A court order, either 
in the form of a will, a probate or a grant of administration, is necessary to 
empower a personal representative to deal with the deceased’s estate. The 
English courts have discretion as to whether they grant administration of the 
estate, but usually only do so if there is property located in England.93 
During the administration the assets are identified, debts paid and the estate 
balance established.94 The representative becomes the owner of the estate 
and deals with any outstanding liabilities before distributing the estate to 
those entitled to it. The English approach guarantees that the debt does not 
pass to the heirs.95
 
 
Once a personal representative has been properly constituted before the 
English court, the court has to deal with the estate as a whole, regardless of 
whether the estate consists of immovable or movable property. Hence, 
English courts have jurisdiction to determine the succession to the property 
situated in England of any individuals regardless of domicile.96
 
   
The Non-Contentious Probate Rules 198797 governs the appointment of 
personal representatives in English law. Rule 30 in the NCPR applies where 
the deceased died domiciled outside of England. In general, where the 
deceased is domiciled abroad, English courts will issue a grant to a personal 
representative appointed under the law of the deceased’s domicile. 98 A grant 
may also be issued to a person entrusted with the administration of the estate 
by the court that has jurisdiction, if this is ordered by a registrar.99
 
 
Where the estate of a person who died domiciled outside England consists 
of immovable property in England only, a grant may be issued in respect of 
the whole estate in accordance with the law that would have applied if the 
                                               
91 Ibid, Recommendation 7.1. 
92 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 33-34. 
93 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), Rule, 129. 
94 Harris, (2008), p. 191. 
95 Ibid, Rule 137. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Hereinafter referred to as NCPR. 
98 NCPR, 30(1)(a). 
99 Ibid, 30(1)(b). 
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deceased had died domiciled in England.100 A foreign administrator has no 
right to be appointed in England and a foreign administrator appointed to act 
in England would exercise his powers in accordance with the lex fori. 
Accordingly there is no question of a foreign administrator exercising the 
powers that he holds under a foreign law in England.101
 
 
Despite the foregoing the Regulation takes the English administration 
proceedings into consideration and the differences seem to have been 
resolved as far as they can be by article 21 in the Regulation. The article 
provides that “The law applicable to the succession shall be no obstacle to 
the application of the law of the Member State in which the property is 
located where it subjects the administration and liquidation of the 
succession to the appointment of an administrator or executor of the will via 
an authority located in this Member State.” 102
 
 However, this provision 
relates to administration and does not affect the court competence. If 
England decides not to opt in after the ongoing negotiations, one wonders 
whether article 21 would continue to be retained in the Regulation. 
The English substantive law may need to be amended to enforce an 
obligation on personal representatives to administer the whole of the 
succession. No doubt the easiest and most attractive solution for England 
would be for the Regulation to state in terms that it does not cover 
administration of estate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
100 Ibid 30(3)(b). 
101 Harris, (2008), p. 192. 
102 Article 21(2)(a) of the Regulation. 
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6 RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
6.1 Introduction 
The benefits to be derived from the simplification of the rules resolving 
conflicts of applicable law and jurisdiction can be improved by making the 
decisions taken in one Member State recognisable and enforceable in 
another. A person benefiting from a decision in one Member State would not 
incur additional costs and delays in going through a process in another 
Member State in order to have that decision given effect. The question arises 
whether such recognition and enforcement shall be subject to any protection 
to uphold the public policy of the Member States in which recognition or 
enforcement is sought. The Regulation proposes that decisions made in one 
Member State, whether made by court or by notaries in the form of 
authentic instruments, shall be recognised and enforced in other Member 
States in accordance with rules based on those currently in place in respect 
of civil and commercial matters.103
6.2 Court decisions 
 
It would not require any special procedures to recognise a decision of a 
court in another Member State. The court in which recognition is requested 
may refuse on limited grounds that: a) the recognition was “manifestly 
contrary” to public policy; b) the defendant had insufficient opportunities to 
arrange for his defence and c) the decision was irreconcilable with an 
existing decision given in a dispute between the same parties.104
 
 In England, 
a court decision will be recognised if it is final, conclusive and rendered by 
a court that had international jurisdiction under English conflict of law rules 
and if there is no defence of its recognition. 
Regarding enforcement, the procedure involves obtaining a declaration of 
enforceability in the court of the Member States according to a single 
simplified procedure. A declaration of enforceability may only be refused on 
the grounds on which recognition may be refused. 105
 
 
                                               
103 Article 29 of the Regulation, House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of 
Session 2009-10, p. 31. 
104 Article 29 of the Regulation. 
105 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 32. 
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6.3 Authentic instruments 
Article 2 in the Regulation defines authentic instruments as instruments 
formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments, the authenticity of 
which relates to the signing and content of the instruments and has been 
established by a public authority or other authority empowered by the 
Member State of origin for that purpose.106
 
 
This provision shall ensure the free movement of authentic instruments by 
giving them the same evidentiary effect with regard to their content and 
facts as national instruments. They are presumed to be authentic. In recital 
26 of the Regulation the Commission clarifies that, in order to take into 
account the Member States’ different methods of settling the issues 
regarding succession, the Regulation guarantees the recognition and 
enforcement of authentic instruments. “The recognition of authentic 
instruments means that they enjoy the same evidentiary effect with regard to 
their contents and the same effects as in their country of origin, as well as a 
presumption of validity which can be eliminated if they are contested”.  
Hence, this validity will always be contestable before a court in the Member 
State of origin of the authentic instrument, in accordance with the 
procedural conditions defined by the Member State.107
 
 Furthermore, the 
recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments may only be refused if 
they are contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which 
enforcement was sought. 
In the English response to the Regulation many witnesses raised the issues 
of recognition and enforcement of decisions taken by notaries in the form of 
authentic instruments and advocated that authentic instruments should have 
the status of high quality evidence rather than be recognisable and 
enforceable. It was stressed by the witness, Professor Matthews in the 
House of Lords, that the notaries' purpose is to record and give publicity to 
transactions, which usually are concluded in the context of an agreement by 
the relevant parties, rather than of a dispute. Given the absence of litigation, 
notarial acts tend not to have the same safeguards built into them as 
decisions of courts. In particular, a notary may not have the same awareness 
of existing disputes affecting the succession to a certain property and may 
not give all interested parties the opportunity to state their case.108
 
 
Recognition of notarial acts may circumvent the English procedures for 
personal representatives completely. Since England has no real notarial 
tradition it does not share common rules of jurisdiction with other Member 
States in this area and it seems very difficult for England to extend the 
doctrine of mutual trust to notaries. These are highly problematic provisions 
for England. The House of Lords stressed that the mutual recognition and 
                                               
106 Article 2 lit h of the Regulation. 
107 Recital 26 of the Regulation. 
108 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 33. 
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enforcement of court decisions is acceptable in principle, however they do 
not consider that there is sufficient mutual trust to justify making authentic 
instruments recognisable and enforceable. Just as many witnesses, they 
consider that authentic instruments should be given the status of 
evidence.109
If England does not opt into the Regulation it is difficult to say what the 
impact of the recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments would 
be in concrete. As the provision is rather unusual for common law 
jurisdictions it is unclear how this system of mutual recognition and 
enforcement of authentic instruments would work in practice. England has  
no notarial tradition that can be compared to the continent and, as a result, 
follow a different concept of authentic instruments than the countries 
adhering to the habits of the notariat latin.
 
110 To extend mutual trust to 
notarial acts could endanger procedures for personal representatives and 
does not fit with the procedures during the administration of estate. 111
 
 
6.4 European certificate of succession 
The Green Paper states that: “Evidence of status as heir is given in different 
ways, depending on the legal system. It is essential for heirs to be able to 
assert their rights and take possession of the property to which they succeed 
without having to go through further formalities. With harmonised conflict 
rules, it would be possible to establish a certificate having uniform effects 
throughout the Community. This would undeniably constitute value 
added”.112 The Regulation creates a European Certificate of Succession 
(ECS), which is a document in standard form produced by a court in a 
Member State having jurisdiction in accordance with the general rules on 
jurisdiction set out in the Regulation. The ECS consists of specific 
information relating to a succession including: the grounds for the issuing 
court to assume competence to do so, information concerning the deceased 
and the death, the applicable law and the reasons for determining it, the 
elements of fact or law giving rise to the power to administer the succession 
and what those powers are, who is entitled to get what and any restrictions 
on the rights of the heirs and details of the applicant for the certificate.113
  
 
Article 42 in the Regulation sets out the effect of an ECS. The ECS shall be 
recognised automatically for the purpose of the administration of the 
succession and determining who gets what of the deceased’s estate. The 
content of an ECS shall be presumed to be accurate in all Member States 
and any person who passes property in accordance with an ECS shall be 
released from their obligations unless they know that it is not accurate. 
                                               
109 Ibid, p. 30. 
110 Member States that are part of the notariat latin use similar forms of authentic 
instruments. The concepts are different in Scandinavia, the UK and Spain. 
111 Harris, (2008), p. 226. 
112 COM (2005) 65, p. 10. 
113 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 6th Report of Session 2009-10, p. 34. 
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Those who acquire succession property in accordance with an ECS shall be 
considered to have properly acquired it. 
 
Furthermore, the ECS shall constitute a valid document allowing inherited 
property to be registered.114
 
 The fact that an ECS shall be recognised in all 
Member States, shall be presumed accurate and can only be rectified by the 
court issuing it has important consequences. It means that inaccurate 
information in an ECS can be difficult to correct, and in the meantime it 
would be necessary to proceed on the basis of the ECS until it is altered. 
Inaccurate information in an ECS as to the habitual residence or nationality 
of the deceased would mean that the effect could not be given to a choice 
made by a testator of the applicable law to be applied to the succession until 
the issuing court has rectified or cancelled the ECS. 
The ECS intends to simplify the process in succession cases as it shall be 
issued quickly.115
 
 Although this is a welcomed effect, it is, however, difficult 
to fulfil this aim for legal orders based on a representative system, as the 
whole procedure of administration has to be terminated before the heirs can 
even be identified. Whilst a grant of representation relating to the powers of 
administrators is issued by a court, a broader certificate of succession is not 
issued in England. An ECS would require English courts to amend their 
existing domestic procedures. In that sense, the dividing line between 
harmonisation of private international law and substantive law erodes. 
Furthermore, even if the certificate is intended only to have evidential status 
rather than being conclusive, it may be the case that such documents are 
effectively treated as conclusively determining the devolution of the estate 
unless very narrow grounds are made out providing the contrary.116
From an English perspective, the practical implementation of an ECS is 
subject to obstacles for legal systems that are not familiar with the concept 
of such a certificate and which are based on a system with compulsory 
administration. 
 
                                               
114 Article 42 of the Regulation. 
115 Article 40(1) of the Regulation. 
116 See the joint response of the Law Society and STEP, Appendix A, p. 14. 
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7 ANALYSIS 
The probability of the English Government remaining on the sidelines in 
this proposed Regulation is very worrying. However, even if English legal 
scholars have questioned the statistics there seems to be rather widespread 
English consensus on the usefulness of an EU Regulation on succession and 
wills. English citizens are one of the biggest groups of Europeans moving to 
other Member States of the EU and the number of cross border successions 
is growing equally fast, implying various practical problems for mobile 
English citizens as well as their families. 
 
At present, conflicts arise under the present multitude of regimes and 
conflict of laws rules in matters of succession differ from one Member State 
to the other. Authorities of several Member States may be competent to rule 
on the same succession and can declare different substantive laws 
applicable. Moreover, options for mobile EU citizens to clarify this situation 
by a professio iuris are lacking in many countries and a mix of various 
national rules and bilateral or regional agreements on recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and documents leads to a very unsatisfactory 
situation. The outcome of a succession can become unforeseeable. 
 
In principle therefore, efforts to simplify and clarify the rules that apply to 
international successions could produce huge benefits for English citizens 
and the Government is strongly supportive of the project in principle. 
However, there are potentially significant problems identified with the 
proposal that has been presented in the thesis. 
 
These significant problems identified have a first origin in differing 
concepts of common law and civil law jurisdictions in the area of succession 
and property law. The cornerstones of both legal families are very different, 
from the mere question of what is included in the notion of succession, e.g. 
only the estate at the time of death or also previous inter vivos transactions, 
to more complicated questions like opposite positions between civil law and 
common law jurisdictions concerning  clawback and compulsory 
inheritance rights or the different attitudes regarding the question of 
personal representation and administration of estate 
 
7.1 Habitual residence 
The concept of habitual residence as the key connecting factor within the 
Regulation may pose difficulties. Its success will depend on the degree to 
which the concept succeeds in identifying suitable jurisdictions and national 
succession laws with a high degree of predictability. This may be essential 
to avoid expensive and unnecessary litigations. 
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The main problem with the concept of habitual residence is the lack of 
adequate clarity. This may lead to the situation where a English national 
who prior to death worked in another Member State where he has retained 
habitually residence, but with the intention to return to England, is being 
subject to the law of the Member State where he died, unless he has chosen 
the law of his nationality to apply to his estate.   
 
A single factor to provide for the connection between the applicable law and 
a succession is very hard to find. I do believe that the concept of habitual 
residence should be used as the connecting factor in the Regulation. 
However, it is necessary to define the concept, something that is legally 
possible. Citizens should not be left to bear the expenses of defining the 
concept through litigation. The definition should at least address the issues 
above with citizens working, living or having their central interests in more 
than one Member State.   
7.2 Clawback 
The rules of clawback have the potential to cause considerable problems in 
practice and the importation of such claims is likely to have a significant 
adverse impact on the certainty of lifetime gifts completed within England. 
 
Two areas with particular concern emerge. These relate to gifts to charities 
based in England and assets deposited in trusts where the introduction of 
clawback is likely to harm the operation of trusts in England. 
7.2.1 Charities and trusts 
Charities are organisations that benefit the public in such a way that the law 
agrees is charitable. In England there are over 200.000 registered charities 
which provide a benefit or service to the public. To a greater or lesser 
degree, charities normally receive a proportion of their funding from 
voluntary funding, derived from gifts, donations and legacies from the 
public.117
  
 From the charities' perspective, clawback may destabilise their 
work in terms of funding and as a result lead to a reduction in legacy 
income, which is a significant income stream for many fundraising 
organisations. 
A solution to resolve the difficult problems of clawback would be to exclude 
clawback claims against individuals who have been given property by the 
deceased during his lifetime from the scope of the Regulation. The 
exclusion of clawback would not mean that these claims would not be 
recognised or enforced in Member States currently recognising and 
enforcing them, but the recognition and enforcement would remain a matter 
                                               
117 Dicey, Morris and Collins, (2006), Rule, 17. 
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of national, rather than Community law. Hence, this would lead to the 
preservation of the status quo. 
 
Another option would be to exclude clawback claims in certain Member 
States, such as England, where these claims are unknown and where they 
would create significant legal uncertainty. This flexible option would be an 
advantage for those Member States permitting clawback claims and that are 
prepared to recognise and enforce such claims from other Member States as 
it would be regulated at Community level; however, with the disadvantages 
that it would result in a non-uniform application of the Regulation. 
7.3 Choice of law 
Article17 in the Regulation enable individuals to choose the law of the 
Member State of which they are nationals. This provision is another concern 
that needs to be highlighted as reference has not been made to domicile, 
other than in recital 32 of the Regulation. This can lead to confusion on the 
applicable law, as well as an uncertainty as to how effective this provision 
will be for English nationals since a large proportion do not make any 
testamentary provisions. 
 
Although I welcome article 17, it needs to be clarified to ensure that the 
freedom of an individual to choose the applicable law should take effect 
from the time when the choice is made. This is important to secure the 
policy of legal certainty, which should underpin this provision. Although I 
agree with the choice of law having to be limited to preserve the appropriate 
level of connection between the law chosen and the succession, limiting the 
choice to the law of nationality is too narrow. It should be possible for an 
individual to have a broader choice of law and choose the law of the country 
with which they have a close and concrete connection. 
7.3.1 Article 21(2)(a) 
Article 21(2)(a) in the Regulation concerns the application of the law of the 
Member State in which property is located under certain circumstances. The 
effect of this provision is to preserve the system of personal representatives 
which currently operates in England. 
 
I support the general intention behind the article and no points of real 
controversy are raised. However, I find the scope of the article not to be 
wide enough. In particular, article 21(2)(a) needs to be clarified so as to put 
beyond doubt that it takes primacy over article 19. 
 
In order to ensure the flexible administration of estate in England, the article 
should make clear that it also preserves the lex fori in respect of both the 
selection of administrators and the powers of those individuals to act within 
England. It is also important that this provision facilitates the payment of 
debtors as this is a key aspect of the probate process. 
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7.3.2 Article 22 
Article 22 in the Regulation creates an exception to the choice of law rules 
for special succession regimes. This provision is likely to be problematic as 
the exception is widely drawn and it is uncertain in its scope. It is therefore 
likely that the provision will create legal uncertainty as to which law should 
be applied. This lack of clarity could undermine the certainty and 
predictability in the choice of law system that are fundamental features of 
the Regulation. 
 
It is also unclear to what extent it would apply in relation to England. If it 
does not have significant practical application in relation to the different 
laws in England, it would also be open to objections for failing to establish 
equivalence of treatment between the laws of all the Member States. One 
solution to create legal certainty on this matter is to let all the special 
succession regimes referred to in the provision be set out in an Annex to the 
Regulation. These should be the only regimes preserved under this article 
and the Member States should be able to supplement or delete their national 
legislation as regards this Annex. 
 
7.4 Jurisdiction 
Article 5 in the Regulation provides for the transfer of cases in some 
instances. This article may have been drafted too restrictively. It may be 
discussed as to whether transfers may be appropriate in circumstances other 
than where there has been a selection of foreign law. In principle there 
should be some additional flexibility in the application of the Regulation’s 
rules of jurisdiction. It would be preferable to reformulate article 5 so as to 
align the rules of jurisdiction with those on choice of law. This would lead 
to greater legal certainty and enhance estate planning by the deceased, 
particular in cases with complex circumstances. 
 
A provision to facilitate the transfer of jurisdiction in certain other types of 
cases would be of value. For example, where a court in a Member State has 
jurisdiction on one of the residual bases in article 6, it should be considered 
if such courts within the EU should be allowed to transfer the proceedings to 
the courts of the State outside the EU where the deceased was habitually 
resident at the time of death. The latter courts may be better placed to deal 
with the succession, especially if the deceased’s property is located within 
their jurisdiction together with the heirs. 
 
Another type of case is where the deceased has chosen the law of a non- 
Member State of which he is a national. Transfer in these cases would 
improve the relationship between the EU and the rest of the world. 
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7.5 Authentic instruments 
Articles 34 and 35 in the Regulation provide for the recognition and 
enforcement of authentic instruments. These instruments are widely drawn 
up by notaries in many Member States, but not in England. Under the 
Regulation, recognition and enforcement can only be resisted by an 
objection that the instruments contravenes public policy. This gives such 
instruments a preferential position compared to court decisions where 
recognition and enforcement can be resisted on other grounds under article 
30. 
 
The objection to this provision is that the grounds for resisting the 
recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments appear to be too 
limited. All grounds for non-recognition and enforcement which are 
available under article 30 in relation to court decisions should also be 
available to authentic instruments. This reflects the fact that authentic 
instruments are more informal than court decisions and would not fall 
within the scope of the rules of jurisdiction under the Regulation. 
7.6 European certificate of succession 
Articles 36 to 44 in the Regulation provide for an ECS within the EU. The 
legal effect of such a document is unclear; it may be intended to be 
conclusive and not merely of evidential value. This certificate is likely to 
prove to be of great significance and practical application, specially in those 
Member States with notarial traditions. As with authentic instruments, there 
is an issue as to whether there are sufficient mutual trusts to justify the far-
reaching effects of an ECS. However, the provision providing that an ECS 
must be drawn up by a competent court with jurisdiction under the 
Regulation may be thought to constitute a significant safeguard and 
provides some reassurance in this context.   
 
Since it is only the court which issued the ECS that can rectify or cancel it, 
courts in Member State to which the ECS was sent are apparently not 
entitled to refuse recognition on any ground and the ECS is given 
preferential position compared to court decisions. 
 
There are a number of concerns regarding the ECS. Some of the provisions 
relating to the ECS concern issues relating to the administration of estate. 
These should be properly regulated by the Member States’ national laws 
where part of the deceased’s estate is located and being wound up by local 
administrators. The application of the lex fori to such matters is likely to be 
both more satisfactory and easier than applying any other law in its place. In 
order to maximise this utility, the ECS should be focused on issues of 
entitlement under the succession. It should be made clear that this does not 
override article 21(2). 
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There is also a concern that problems arising with the ECS can only be 
resolved by the Member States that issued it and not in the country 
addressed. This would impose an excessive burden on those raising such 
problems. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The considerable differences between the regimes of the English private 
international law rules on succession and the Regulation can create 
significant complications where a person owns property across borders. 
Efforts to clarify and simplify the rules that apply to cross-border succession 
would therefore be beneficiary to English citizens. A Regulation 
harmonising these rules would be highly welcomed. However, one can not 
help to wondering if this immense work is too much and too soon. This 
thesis illustrates that the Regulation is one of extraordinary ambition. 
Compromises between the legal systems and reconciling the different legal 
traditions are inevitable if the Regulation is to reach a successful conclusion. 
Turning an area of law that has hitherto barely been touched by 
harmonisation into an area of law with utterly harmonised private 
international law rules is a very vast and complex project. 
 
The current proposal is not compatible with the common law legal systems; 
in fact, it would have substantial impact on the English legal traditions. 
This thesis shows England’s wish to ensure that the applicable foreign law 
does not undermine its protection of inter vivos transaction and testamentary 
freedom. Conversely, the ability to choose applicable law in the Regulation 
is keeping with the English idea of testamentary freedom. Additionally, 
many other Member States want to ensure that their laws will not be evaded, 
specially regarding compulsory inheritance, by the application of English 
law. 
 
Altogether, this thesis confirms that the Regulation would be of clear benefit 
to the English citizens in terms of legal certainty. The current national law 
rules may lead to divided court competence and multiple applicable laws 
while the Regulation would confer jurisdiction to the courts of habitual 
residence and declare the lex fori as applicable to the succession as a whole. 
Hence, the individuals concerned only have to face one legal system instead 
of several. However, the connecting factor of habitual residence in the 
Regulation is ground for several problems, not only for England. As there is 
no definition provided by the Regulation and national definitions often vary, 
a single connecting factor is still to be found for the entire EU. As is so 
often the case in private international law, it is tempting to find a single 
connecting factor to solve all problems. But is it worth seeking one 
connecting factor or would flexibility be preferable?   
 
The Regulation’s approach of applying a single law represents a move 
towards simplification. Different laws would no longer apply depending on 
whether assets are immovable or movable, this would enable a testator to 
plan the division of his property between his beneficiaries in a fair way, 
regardless of where the property is located. 
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Moreover, despite the Regulation’s special provision to recognise common 
law legal systems, such as in England, concerning the measure of 
administration of estate in article 21 in the Regulation, the Regulation will 
have great influence on the domestic procedures in relation to the 
administration of estate. The question is whether such a level of upheaval is 
worthwhile for England. 
 
If England does not opt into the Regulation after the ongoing negotiations, 
this dualism of regimes may lead to complications concerning borderline 
cases where a Member State considers English citizens to be habitually 
resident in their State but with immovable property located in England. In 
these situations, the Member State where the deceased was habitually 
resident would apply the Regulation and its unitary approach for the 
succession as a whole while England may apply the lex situs to the 
immovable property. Because of the Regulation’s universal character, it does 
not matter whether England is bound by the Regulation or not for its rules to 
affect English citizens. 
 
Reversely, as the Regulation can only be applied by courts in Member 
States, EU citizens who are habitually resident within England would not 
benefit from the rules of the Regulation if English courts were seised. Thus, 
the succession of those EU citizens would instead be determined by the 
English private international law rules. Consequently, if England does not 
opt into the Regulation, it would be a backward step for cross-border 
successions that involve English citizens as well as for citizens of other 
Member States. 
 
This thesis illustrates that some sort of framework in order to unify the 
private international law rules is long overdue. I do support the proposal and 
see the need for common ways in this matter. However, the Regulation’s 
vast work to satisfy all Member States and to harmonise the rules is a great 
canvas to fill and there is a danger that this house of cards will collapse. 
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